Reading time: 6 – 10 minutes

The Boston Globe released an article on September 20th that took a look at two recent studies on the efficacy of microcredit. The two studies were completed by researchers affiliated with MIT’s Jameel Poverty Action Lab and have not yet been published.  However, according to the Globe the studies are already being called the most thorough and careful studies that have been done on the topic (no sources were cited by the Globe to corroborate that claim). What did the studies find? Here is what the Globe had to say:

What [the studies] find is that, by most measures, microcredit does not offer a way out of poverty. It helps a few of the more entrepreneurial poor to start up businesses, and at the margins it may boost the profits of existing microenterprises, but that doesn’t translate into gains for the borrowers, as measured by indicators like income, spending, health, or education. In fact, most microcredit clients actually spend their borrowed money not on a business, but on household expenses, on paying off other debts or on a relatively big-ticket item like a TV or a daughter’s wedding. And while microcredit champions point to microloans as a tool for empowering women, the studies see no impact on gender roles, and find evidence that if any one group benefits more, it’s male entrepreneurs with existing businesses.

The team that completed the research for “Portfolios of the Poor” also found that a lot of loans aren’t actually used to start, or continue to build, businesses. A lot of the loans are used to pay off debt and to pay for expensive life milestones (like weddings in India and funerals in South Africa) among a myriad of other things. However, even if that is the case, microcredit, with its much lower interest rates, is a much needed alternative to the usurious local moneylenders.

The Globe article goes on to look at the microentrepreneurs that are created through microcredit programs and suggests that we may need to think more macro to solve the poverty issue. That is, we need to think of scale. While building a lot of microbusinesses is a good step toward alleviating poverty we need to recognize that microbusinesses, since they don’t have scale, won’t have as much impact as a growing a scalable business that, over time, will provide many new jobs. That is a completely valid point and one that deserves some more research.

Now that we have taken a look at some of the conclusions of the studies we should take some time to look at the methodology of the studies.  One of the main pieces of information I noticed was the time frame of the studies. The studies were completed over a 1.5 – 2 year time span.  It is debatable whether or not that was a long enough span of time to obtain meaningful results. One of the reasons that I really loved “Portfolios of the Poor” was that the studies were completed over a much longer time span and data was collected at closely spaced intervals. I do believe that to get solid data in the microfinance world you need more data points over a long period of time.  I am not ready to discount anything in the new MIT studies though since I have not even had that chance to read them.

The first study, completed by Dean Karlan (economics professor at Yale) and Jonathan Zinman (associate economics professor at Dartmouth), looked at a single bank in the Phillipines that offered microloans. They asked the bank to institute an algorithm that would approve some borderline people for a loan and deny others.  Then Karlan and Zinman followed up with both sets of subjects to see what the effect of the loans were. It turns out that, in this case, the loans didn’t seem to have much of an effect.

Neither household income nor spending rose for those who got microloans. And borrowers who did put the money into their businesses – instead of using it, as many did, for household expenses – actually shrank rather than grew their businesses. Karlan and Zinman suggest that this might be because the business owners were taking advantage of the loan to fire unproductive workers to whom they owed financial favors, and those firings seemed to explain the very small gains in profit Karlan and Zinman found. In addition, the gains accrued only to male entrepreneurs, not the women usually targeted by microcredit programs.

The second study, authored by Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo (economics professors at MIT) along with Rachel Glennerster (executive director of the Poverty Action Lab) and an MIT economics doctoral student named Cynthia Kinnan, found a larger impact than the first study, albeit a selective one.

Working with a microcredit bank in India that was looking to expand in the city of Hyderabad, the researchers did find some small positive effects. Borrowers who already had a business did see some increase in profit. Households without businesses that the researchers judged more predisposed to start one were found to cut back on spending, suggesting they were saving to augment their loan for a capital business expense like a pushcart or a sewing machine. The researchers also found small but encouraging shifts in household spending across the board, with less money spent on “temptation goods” like alcohol, tobacco, and gambling.

However, overall household spending stayed about the same and the authors found no effect on children’s health or education levels.

Duflo thinks that those results only look disappointing since the expectations for microcredit are so high.  She is probably right. However, it is hard to take too much away from these studies.

The studies were very limited in scope, both of them only looking at one specific bank and then at a subset of the bank’s loan recipients. Because of the limited time frame and scope I am not sure one can rely too heavily on the results of these studies. Of course, I think most rational microcredit enthusiasts and practitioners would agree that microcredit isn’t going to solve the poverty problem by itself. It is simply a new tool in the development arsenal and one that is arguably very potent and sustainable.

Tyler Cowen, an economics professor at George Mason University and one of my favorite bloggers, gave a quote in the Globe piece that lines up with part of my thinking on the issue:

“The fact that [microcredit] has survived commercially, I take that more seriously than any other piece of evidence.”

The commercial viability of microcredit is one of the things that gets me excited about it. Having an effective, and sustainable, development tool is a very powerful thing.

At the end of the day, what these studies do help us understand is that we need to do more. Focusing on building other financial services like savings and insurance will be an important part of the solution going forward. Also, funding enterprises that have graduated from the “micro” level could be another important innovation. It will help bridge the gap between microcredit and working with a standard bank, which, at this point, is quite large.

The Globe article mentions that the Grameen Bank is already looking at an initiative where they will create loans of up to $10,000 for what they call minibusinesses. Other NGOs are even investing in neglected medium-sized businesses and receiving equity stakes in return for their capital.

The future of microfinance and microcredit is bright. Of course there is still a lot we need to learn in order to make better financial products for the poor.  Studies like the ones discussed in this article are very important for that reason. When it comes to development (or really anything) we should always study the efficacy of programs to ensure that they are performing well.  If they aren’t performing well then innovation needs to happen but innovation can only happen when we know the truth.

(via Boston Globe Article by Drake Bennett)

Reading time: 5 – 8 minutes

Talk about secondary markets for private company stock has been heating up recently but the thought has been around for quite some time.  In fact I, along with others, wrote about secondary markets for private company stock in 2007 and 2008 and I am certain that the argument goes much further back than 2007 since the idea is essentially low hanging fruit.

Why is talk about secondary markets heating up now?

It seems the secondary market idea, as expected, tends to come back every time startups (and venture investors) have very few exit possibilities.  As of late things have been looking very grim with regard to exits.

The public markets have been virtually shut down in terms of startup IPOs for some time now.  In fact, I saw some numbers (via the NVCA) the other day that showed how bad the IPO market has become.  There were roughly 86 VC backed IPOs in 2007, 6 (yes, that’s a single digit) in 2008 and 0 thus far in 2009 (goose egg).

OK, so what about M&A activity?  From 2004 to 2008 M&A activity has hovered around 350ish VC backed M&A exits per year or about 87 M&A exits per quarter.  Q1 of 2009 saw only 56.  You may think that that number isn’t too far off the average but when it comes to the average size of M&A exits over time the picture becomes clearer.

In 2007 the average M&A deal size was $177mm.  2008 saw a decline to $115.7.  2009, thus far, comes in at a whopping $49.6mm average M&A deal size for VC backed startups.  Ouch!

Where else can we (entrepreneurs and VCs) get liquidity?

That’s certainly a loaded question but one that needs to be taken seriously and addressed.  Why? Well, if liquidity events are rare then VCs won’t make many investments and, therefore, startups will become more rare and, thus, a vicious cycle ensues that severely impacts our economy (especially given that VC backed startups are a large job creation engine for this country).

This is how we get to the idea of secondary markets.  Secondary markets exist for many illiquid assets at this time.  In fact, secondary markets even exist for Venture Capital fund positions (i.e. LPs can sell of their VC investments in a secondary market).

I have to admit that I do find the idea of secondary markets for VC backed (and non-VC backed startups) intriguing but I am starting to see some issues with the whole concept.  That said, before I get into some of the issues I would like to chat quickly about a pain in the butt accounting rule that may actually help to enable secondary markets for private company stock to function.

FAS 157

A lot has been written about FAS 157 and how terrible the rule is. Even FASB didn’t like the first version of the rule they released.  That said what FAS 157 does, in part, is force VCs to value their investments each quarter.  Since this is a giant hassle (for reasons I may take a whole other post to describe – on second thought that would just be tortuous for you and I so I will skip that post) a lot of valuation firms have been springing up to help VCs and other funds (PE, hedge funds, etc.) value their investments.

As a by product of this rule lots of data is being generated on private companies and the valuations over time.  This data could potentially form the backbone of a secondary market for private company stock (i.e. these valuations could be likened to the analyst reports for public companies and the secondary market participants would then go ahead setting the price for the private company stock).

Wow, this sounds great! What could possibly be wrong with a secondary market for private companies?

This is, again, quite a question.  One of my big concerns about a secondary market for private companies was something I initially missed in my thinking about them.  The issue is this:

If private companies begin to be traded on a secondary market and, through FAS 157, are valued regularly, what stops private companies from focusing on the short term (i.e. short term value of the company, etc.) just like publicly traded companies do (to their detriment it seems)?

One thing that is great about startups is that by nature they take the long view.  Startups try to create long term value and they tend not to worry about short term valuations of their stock or short term revenue opportunities.

If a secondary market begins to take that long term thinking away by pushing companies to focus short term doesn’t a private company simply become a defacto public company albeit with less regulation imposed on it?  I think it may.

Some other issues that come up are equally large.  In the words of Fred Wilson:

I understand that there are issues with this development. It will be harder to strike options at low prices when the company’s stock has a price history. It will be harder to control who the shareholders are and it will be harder to keep employees motivated to stick around if they can cash out early. These are all problems companies usually don’t face until they go public. Now they will have to face them earlier.

The issue that is that heart of the couple Fred mentions is continuity.  One reason startups are able to take the long view is that they generally have a stable management team and a stable group of investors/board members. Part of the stability of startups lies in the fact that everyone is in it together for the long term so-to-speak since they can’t liquidate their positions easily. If founders, investors, board members and employees can suddenly liquidate their stock fairly easily what is left to keep them around?

If you can’t keep your people around then you need to bring in new people. Now you’ve lost time and continuity, which is bad enough but you are also going to have a hard time setting option strike prices at a rate that give the potential new employees good upside potential.

In my mind, there is enough to worry about in an early stage startup without having to worry about a lot of the things startups have to worry about only when they go public.  It seems that adding more issues to the mix will potentially decrease the success rate of startups.

In conclusion

Fred and others (VCs and entrepreneurs alike) are fans of the secondary market idea even though they see the issues that come about. Even I can’t say that I am not, at some level, a fan of the idea (we need something that allows for liquidity).  It just seems to me that these secondary markets need to be well thought out so we don’t lose the long term thinking and alignment of interests that are both big parts of the world of startups and necessary for continued innovation and economic growth.

Reading time: 2 – 3 minutes

Matt McCall and I had a conversation a few days back about Dan Primack’s post on new VC models (I wrote about Dan’s piece a little over a week ago for those that missed it). I focused on the fact that too much money has been pushed into venture capital during both my conversation with Matt and in my blog post and I do believe that it is a main issue.  However, it appears that the increasing amount of money going into VC funds has a couple of underlying causes (if not more).

1. LPs are trying to push more money into venture capital funds to get lower their unfunded obligations.
2. Venture capitalists are only too happy to take the extra cash to bump up their management fees (since exits and carried interest are hard to come by these days).

Unfortunately point number two is causing a big issue.

VCs nowadays, at least the ones who have raised successive ~$500mm – $800mm funds (i.e. large funds) every couple of years, are in a position where management fees are so high that they can potentially lead to salaries to the main partners in the $6mm – $8mm range (give or take).

This fact, combined with the fact that the IPO market is essentially closed (meaning it is harder to generate exits and, subsequently, carried interest), means that VCs are content raising a lot of cash and deploying it fast so they can cash in on their management fees.  Any good investments that create some carried interest are simply a bonus.

For venture capital to work, carried interest, the amount the partners take of successful deals, needs to be the main driver.  Once management fees get too high they can become a primary driver and, as mentioned above, this scenario becomes even more pronounced when the IPO market is lacking and exits are harder to come by.

Matt just wrote about a post about his thoughts on the VC compensation issue, which, given his many years of experience, has a lot more meat to it than this post.  It is a must read post so please check it out when you have a chance. (Matt also talks about the structure of Warren Buffett’s first fund, which is interesting to note especially in the context of VC compensation.)

Reading time: 5 – 8 minutes

Dan Primack of PE Hub passes along an idea on how to revolutionize venture capital in his latest post. The idea, given to him from an unnamed Boston based VC, centers around the partner as the core of the VC fund.  Partners have always been the core of a VC fund, right?  Right.  However, in this new model Primack suggests there aren’t really any partners to speak of.  Each “partner” would work on his or her own with his or her own pool of money provided by one (or perhaps more) LPs.

The analogy Primack uses to explain this new idea is that of a professional athlete.  VCs have been compared to professional athletes for a long time due to a number of similarities with both professions. In this case the similarity we’ll focus on is that VCs, like professional athletes, usually work in teams but are judged on their individual numbers.

The issue with teams both in sports and in the VC world is that the stars can get pulled down by poor team members.  So, the thought is, why can’t a star VC just go “one-on-one” and raise an evergreen fund  from one LP (or perhaps more) that only he or she will manage.  These star VCs can then sign contracts with their LPs  (3 – 5 years to start was what was suggested), take a salary of $1mm per year, get 15% of any carry and hire an assistant and an associate.

It is suggested that this new venture capital model would provide better returns for LPs if the star VCs remained stars and, even if those VCs dropped off, the LPs would lose less then they would have if they picked a losing fund with multiple team members.

Primack, of course, realizes there are some issues with this idea and lists them in his post.  Two of them caught my eye:

1. What about the fact that the partnership model encourages working together to figure out if the deals a firm is looking at are really the best deals? Partners, in theory, should be helpful in that they may have different points of view about a deal that the deal-leading partner didn’t think of, etc., etc.

Primack refutes this by saying that most modern partnerships operate within a quid pro quo of silence. i.e. Don’t knock my deal and I won’t knock yours.  I haven’t been involved in any funds other than DFJ Portage and we operate in a very collegial way and speak our minds freely. That said, I actually haven’t seen Primack’s argument in reality although I could see his argument being the case at larger funds.

2. Would LPs be able to pick the right individual VCs?

That’s a big question but if an LP is on top of the goings on of their VC funds they probably already know who the superstars in their funds are.

I think the bigger question really is: Would the superstars consistently perform?

I don’t have the data on this but I know my friends at Cambridge Associates do so perhaps they can carry out this proposed study for me (hint, hint).

My idea for a study is to look at data from as far back as one can until the present day and then use the data to figure out if superstars are consistent over a long period of time or if the superstars during one 5 – 10 period are the dogs of the next. My guess: they aren’t consistent over long periods of time.

I fixate on this particular issue for one main reason and that is the fact that even the biggest of the big name VC funds – the blue chips as it were – are inconsistent in their returns.  Some of a given firms’ funds are top quartile and others are bottom quartile and some are in between.

A number of the big guys have fund returns that look like a roller coaster and it makes me think that the superstars would not fare much better.

Another point along the same line of thinking is that the superstar VC may actually be a superstar due to his or her team.  This point is also highly correlated to the entrepreneurs VCs back in that the team (the entrepreneurs plus the folks they hire) is everything.  Entrepreneurs have to be great leaders but they also need to hire great teams around them if they intend on bringing their companies to the highest level. Venture capitalists may also need their teams to help the VCs perform at the highest level possible.

With all that said it seems to me that trying to move the industry as a whole to the individual model or the partnership model doesn’t make much sense.  What works will differ based on the individual.  Some folks work well alone, some with a team, and so on and so forth.  What we, as an industry, probably need to address is the following:

Too much money has been flowing into VC for a while now.

Because of this fact funds are too big to do what VC is supposed to do.  $100mm or less (maybe a little more in some cases) is probably a good size fund for true seed and early stage investing.  Venture capital just doesn’t scale well and perhaps we need to accept this as an industry.  This is an important point and one that still needs to be addressed.

I am continually thinking about how to improve venture capital because I think venture capital is vital to the creation of great companies and life improving technologies. It has become fashionable to argue otherwise and I am actually happy about that.  I relish the posts about the death of venture capital.  Why? Well, because I try to look at those posts as a challenge for us, the VCs, to do better.  We can always do better.

Perhaps this superstar VC idea isn’t the way to improve venture capital (although some folks could try the model as it may work for some) but I am sure that through all of the discourse we will have as an industry in the coming years we’ll figure out of a few things that will make venture capital better at doing what it is supposed to do: find and fund bright entrepreneurs and then help them to create the next generation of new technology companies that will move the human race forward (while also generating a great return for our LPs of course).

Reading time: 6 – 10 minutes

I have to admit that Umair Haque’s recent two part series of posts on venture capital really made me want to start writing on this blog again.  His posts, entitled “Asleep at the Wheel of Creative Destruction” and “Five Problems Venture Capitalists Should Have Solved (But Didn’t)” really got me thinking.  In the words of my friend and partner in TECH cocktail crime, Frank Gruber, Haque got me “fired up!”

At a high level Haque is calling for VCs to step up their game and push innovation forward rather than sitting back, like some have been, and making a lot of “me too” investments that, even if they play out, don’t really move the needle much for the world in terms of meaningful change, job creation, etc. Here, here! I am with him 100% on changing the world for the better.  That’s why a lot of us got into VC and entrepreneurship in the first place.

I agree with Haque on a number of the points in the “Asleep at the Wheel” piece.  It certainly seems that the VC industry is flooded with too much capital looking for homes that don’t exist (however, some places, the Midwest for example, don’t have nearly enough capital to fund the great entrepreneurs, ideas and technologies they have) and that, as Haque puts it, a culture of imitation, rather than innovation, has started to permeate venture capital.  I also agree that “transparency, disclosure and discussion” can help venture capital by allowing it to become more participative and open.

Haque closes “Asleep at the Wheel” with this statement:

Unfortunately, today’s venture investors are about as interested in reform as yesterday’s bankers were. So it just might take a venture crash – just like Wall St’s financial crash – to wake up the guys and gals asleep at the wheel of creative destruction.

Ouch!  He may be right about some folks but, as long time readers know, I have been a big fan of innovation in the VC business for some time now (and have written about some innovative ideas in detail) and there are many other forward thinking VCs that are interested in improving their business too.

That said, we need to figure out a way to innovate that can also provide great returns for our investors.  One of the main issues is that we hold illiquid investments for a relatively long period of time before we can either sell them or, hold on to your hats people, IPO them (haven’t seen one of those in a while).  Once we put money into a company the clock starts ticking and, when the investment is finally exited, that clock allows VCs and their investors to calculate the efficiency or quality of an investment, which comes in the form of an IRR or Internal Rate of Return.

The IRR allows different investments to be compared to each other directly to help asses if the VC investment was a good one as compraed to, say, putting money in an S&P 500 index fund (i.e. just because you received 5x your money, for example, doesn’t mean the investment was the best one you could have made – the time your money was locked up in that investment needs to factor in).  Here is an example:

Say you invest $1,000,000 in a startup right now and you get $10,000,000 back at some point.  Either way you look at it you got 10 times your money back.  A huge home run right?  Not necessarily.  Let’s take a look at your IRRs at different periods of elapsed time:

$10,000,000 returned at 5 years: IRR = 58%

$10,000,000 returned at 10 years: IRR = 26%

$10,000,000 returned at 15 years: IRR = 17%

$10,000,000 returned at 20 years: IRR = 12%

Interesting isn’t it.  You wouldn’t have done much better than the long term market return if you couldn’t exit your deal before 20 years of hold time.  That means, at 20 years, you and your investors didn’t get a great return especially considering that, generally, the startup you invested in was inherently more risky than the overall market and, therefore, should have had a far better return than the market to account for the excess risk you took (more risk needs to equal more return to make things work – see alpha).

This is why VCs have specific hold time targets (usually about 5 -7 years and sometimes less) and limit their funds’ life to 10 years (if you have to hold investments longer than that the IRRs, even at 10x your money, start to degrade and the folks investing in your VC fund become unhappy).

The folks that invest in venture capital funds (i.e. the big institutions) want returns that make it worth the risk they took and those returns are affected by investment hold time.  Some of the things that Haque suggests VCs should have fixed or innovated on and the markets we should have created don’t appear to have the profiles that would make for good investment where good equals what LPs want in terms of IRRs.  Therefore, even if VCs did dive into this harder-to-solve stuff they may have done a lot of good but the returns may not have been there and, thus, these VCs would not be able to raise a new fund and continue to innovate since their investors would have been unhappy.

Bottom line: if the VC business wants to start moving in the direction of some of the issues Haque puts forth and suggests VCs should have solved than VCs need to figure out how to get the returns their investors demand while pushing forward on harder to solve problems.

At the end of the day venture capital still needs to be sustainable and that means driving good returns to LPs. Good returns enable VCs to continue to raise new money to invest in innovate young companies and to perpetuate the innovation the cycle.  Returns are our constraint as VCs and we need to find creative ways to work within that constraint while still taking on the big risks that help to create new industries and completely revitalize old industries.

This is the challenge and it is a big one but one that will be exciting to work on.

At the end of Haque’s “Five Problems Post” he suggests that if VCs can’t solve problems like:

• Reinventing communications
• Reconceiving capital markets
• Business models for public goods
• Business models for radical responsibility
• Discovering new sources of advantage

than VCs are obsolete.  In fact, he says VCs are obsolete as of right now since we didn’t solve those issues.  I am not sure that he correct when he says that and I do think he trivializes the issues the VC business faces by ignoring the fact that VCs do need to provide returns that make sense to their investors.

However, I tend to look at Haque’s two recent posts as inspiration.  He’s right.  VCs can do better and VCs need to continue to strive to do better and to foster meaningful innovation.

I am not sure what the answers are in terms of working to reshape the VC business into one that address what Haque suggests VCs should be addressing. That said, I am willing to investigate the issues and to try to find some solutions that can get venture capital to the next level and I am sure many others are as well.  I am really glad that Haque and others continue to challenge the VC business.  It is too easy to become complacent and posts like Haque’s can really kick people into gear.

If a number of people heed Haque’s call some really exciting new ideas, businesses and industries will no doubt emerge and we (VCs and entrepreneurs) will continue to be able to combat the world’s largest, and most nagging, issues.

Reading time: 3 – 5 minutes

As a lot of you know, the stock market was my first love as far a business goes.  I have followed the market closely ever since I was 13 and I continue to do so today.  In my relatively short time following the market I have seen some interesting things.  The unprecedented growth in the 1990s.  The tech bubble inflating and eventually bursting. And now I am watching the incredible sell off set in motion by the credit crunch.

I honestly thought that we’d see some support in the markets around the Dow’s 9,000 mark but the market continued to fall.  That surprised me a little bit considering the values that are there for the taking right now.  I am sure the value guys, like my former boss at Eaton Vance, Mike Mach, are starting to snag some solid companies are ridiculously depressed prices and they will make a killing on the upside (value hounds are going to work!).

To me the drop from the 9,000 level to the 8,000 level was complete fear.  Irrationality had set in.  Over the weekend I did some thinking about this while riding my bike on the lake front and I figured that over the weekend people would start to wise up and the smart investors would start buying again due to the incredibly cheap stock sitting right in front of them.  Today it looks like things are picking up a little and perhaps the fear, while still there, is becoming more rational (if that makes sense) and greed is picking up again.

Matt McCall put out a post today about his thoughts on the credit crunch and how long it may last.  McCall gave a time frame that I also would have suggested; about 2 – 3 years of tough times followed by 2 – 3 years of modest growth and then we will see things pick up again.

McCall also wrote about the difference between equity driven crashes and credit driven crashes, which I think bears quoting.

In equity driven situations, investors need to feel that prices have gotten low enough and they will come back in (fear turns to greed). In credit driven crashes, the whole system needs to “de-lever” and the process is longer and more complicated. The core issue is that families have too much debt. So, the debt needs to go away to fix the problem. Unfortunately, because of cheap debt, poor oversight and general greed, this debt party has gone on way too long. Consumers are underwater on mortgages and credit cards and the government is approaching the trillion dollar nut. Fortunately, corporations are generally not as bad off though some will get into trouble.

It seems that investors are starting to believe that prices have reached a point where they are too low (let’s hope anyway!) but, as McCall says, credit is a whole other story and that piece will take a while to clean up.

This credit crunch is a wake up call for all of us.  Americans have alarmingly high debt compared to the rest of the world.  They also have alarmingly low savings rates.  Combine the two and you have a recipe for disaster, a disaster that we’re currently in the midst of.

However, there is a positive side to all of this.  Perhaps Americans will begin to borrow less and save more.  This would be great for the country in the long run.  Also, as far as startups go, times will be lean for the next 3 – 6 years but in year 7 the best and most lean companies will be left standing and they will reap big rewards for their responsible business building efforts.  In essence we will have separated the wheat from the chaff, which will make our economy much stronger going forward.

I am looking forward to McCall’s follow up post on how VCs and portfolio companies can survive the next 5 – 7 years. It should be a good read.  In the meantime I would suggest reading his latest post in full.  It’ll be well worth the five minutes you’ll spend on it.

Reading time: 3 – 5 minutes

This is a question I have been hearing a lot lately and one that I have thought a lot about.  My initial reaction is simply that VCs are long term investors so we don’t freak out about these market fluctuations.  A couple other thoughts I had were simply that the limited partners in VC funds are so large that they will continue to be good for their commitments and that the IPO market is already non-existent so, from that perspective, things can’t get much worse with regards to the the IPO-as-exit exit strategy (however, they can get worse from the get-acquired-by-big-co exit strategy).

Matt McCall referenced a post today on his blog that came from PE Week.  The PE Week post did mention the “long term” comment and some others but also suggested that VCs and their portfolio companies have actually become smarter about business since the dotcom bust and that has helped them weather the current storm without too much worry.

Below you will find the four ways that VCs and portfolio companies have changed since the dotcom bust as published in the PE Week article.  The mindset is certainly different than it was in the bubble but in some ways it is still the same (just this week I saw a couple situations of startups acquiring startups which made me wonder a bit about exit strategies).

1. Better Money Management: Milestones matter to VCs. Ask any entrepreneur, and you’ll find it’s likely he or she are getting money in tranches based on deliverables. Most tranches go through, even when milestones aren’t met, but the process allows VCs a better way of keeping track of the progress of their portfolio companies. VCs are less likely to write mega checks in the early stages, many have raised the bar of proof points needed to get a big round. Money is also more likely to go to things that directly drive valuation increases as a smaller percentage of any round is going to PCs, servers and bandwidth.

2. New Sales Models: It used to be about “Big Game Hunting” and multimillion dollar site licenses. It’s a model that was great for vendors: get all the money up front, then worry about delivering the product. But Software as a Service permanently transformed the way IT was sold. Now new installations are cheaper and can be scaled slowly. It’s a model that’s been adopted by IT appliance and PC companies as well. So when Datamonitor finds that IT budgets aren’t going to rise in 2009 Datamonitor Survey , there’s less reason to freak out. Most IT buyers have already planned their spend out: it’ll be re-upping on the services they’re already subscribed to.

3. Decreased Addiction to Advertising: The banner ad was a big part of any dotcom business model. When advertising budgets fell, hundreds of online businesses shriveled on the vine. Now, online businesses look less to online advertising for real revenue. Google Adwords had a big hand in that. Suddenly it was a lot easier to install advertising on your site, but it was also less lucrative. Nobody ever got rich putting up Google Ads, but at least using the service saves companies from having to hire expensive advertising sales people. The addiction to advertising has been broken and many companies are looking for other ways to make real value online.

4. Moderate Exit Expectations: If you’re not looking to flip a startup to the public market, what do you care that Wall Street’s investment banks are falling like dominos? Had this same crisis had happened 10 years ago, you can bet VCs would be pulling their hair out. But when there are already no IPOs, it’s hard for the public market to get worse. When exit expectations are more reasonable, it’s easier to keep cash burn in check. Startups are less likely to build out sales teams, for example, planning perhaps to later plug in to an exisiting sales organization via aquisition.